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ABSTRACT 
In this explorative study, residual effects of 
feigning were investigated on the basis of self- 
report as well as behavioural data. Participants 
therefore provided self- reported estimates of their 
hearing abilities and conducted a difficult sound 
detection task (informational masking paradigm). 
Participants were manipulated in order to feign 
hearing symptoms voluntarily. The influence of the 
character trait fantasy proneness on the frequency 
of feigning was observed.  The manipulation did 
not lead to the hypothesized behaviour. No 
relationship was found between fantasy proneness 
and a tendency to feign symptoms. Residual effects 
of feigning were not found for self- reported, but 
well for behavioural data. In combination with 
previous findings, this result provides additional 
evidence for the existence of residual effects of 
feigning and shows possible directions for future 
research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A doctor has reliable and objective measures to 
assess the physiological state of his/her patients. 
When a psychologist does the anamnesis of his/her 
patients, he often has to rely on the patient`s self- 
report and self- evaluation. Those involve the 
patient`s subjective experience and interpretation of 
his/her state and symptoms and opens the way to 
exaggeration or downplaying of symptoms. It is the 
psychologist`s task to determine the accuracy of the 
information he/she receives. Inconsistency of 
information obtained from different measures can 
indicate unreliable reports, as do high scores on 
symptom validity scales, like the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Bush et al., 
2005). Nevertheless, it happens that symptoms are 
reported untruthfully. Several studies show that 
there is a number of patients who frequently fail 
symptom validity tests (Kemp et al., 2008; Lockea, 
Smigielskia, Powella & Stevens, 2008; Dandachi-
FitzGerald, Ponds, & Merten, 2013; Chafetz, 2008). 
These findings suggest that patients’ symptom 
reports should not always be taken at face value.  
There are different reasons why patients exaggerate 
or invent symptoms. Many people exaggerate a 
disease from time to time as an excuse to avoid 
unpleasant occasions. When a person intentionally 
reports symptoms for personal gain, this is called 
malingering (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). In contrast, a person is diagnosed with 
factitious disorder when physical or psychological 
symptoms are falsified in the absence of external 
rewards (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Malingering and factitious disorder are 
differentiated from somatic symptom disorder, 
where the patient presents him- or herself with 
somatic symptoms that cannot be medically 
explained, but is himself convinced of the 
symptoms and actually experiencing the illness 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
difference between those conditions is the patient`s 
belief and intentions. A malingering or factitious 
patient is deceiving others, while somatic 
symptoms can be seen as self- deception. 
However, a link has been suggested between self- 
and other deception. The term “imagination 
inflation” refers to the effect that confidence in the 
occurrence of an event increases when the event is 
only imagined (Garry, Manning & Loftus, 1996). 
When a patient is feigning symptoms, imagination 
of the respecting disease is necessary. This might 
lead the patient to rate the existence of the symptom 
as more likely. Investigating the “residual effects of 
feigning”, Merckelbach, Jelicic & Pieters (2011) 
made students deliberately feign symptoms on a 
malingering scale (the Structured Inventory of 
Malingered Symptomatology, Smith & Burger, 
1997, Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). Those students 
continued to report more symptoms later on, when 
instructed to answer honestly, in comparison to a 
control group (Merckelbach et al., 2011). 
Deliberately feigning symptoms thus seems to 
induce residual effects: people may end up 
believing their own fabrications, which results in 
elevated symptom reporting.  
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A possible explanation for these results is the 
mechanism of cognitive dissonance. Intentionally 
misreporting symptoms usually does not fit a 
person`s general belief of being healthy and honest. 
The dissonance between action and belief brings 
about the experience of a state of conflict 
(Merckelbach & Merten, 2012). As the feigning 
cannot be undone, the only way to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance is to accept them as real. This 
leads to the question whether the distinction between 
factitious disorder as well as malingering and 
somatic symptom disorders can be drawn clearly. 
The general tenor is that patients with somatoform 
disorders fabricate symptoms non-consciously, 
whereas malingering and factitious disorder are seen 
as deliberate creation of symptoms (Merckelbach 
et.al., 2011). To investigate the relationship between 
the two conditions, further research concerning the 
residual effects of feigning is necessary. 
Merckelbach et al. (2011) showed such residual 
effects for commonly feigned conditions, like 
amnesia, neurologic impairment, psychosis, 
affective disorders, and low intelligence by means of 
the Structured Inventory of Malingered 
Symptomatology (SIMS) (Merckelbach & Smith, 
2003; Smith & Burger, 1997). However, there are 
many more situations in which feigning can take 
place. Moreover, taking the SIMS as measure, 
Merckelbach et al. (2011) showed residual effects by 
means of self- report, which is subjective and can be 
difficult to interpret. Additionally, the external 
validity of this study can be questioned, as 
participants were explicitly instructed to feign an 
illness. To make the findings more applicable to real-
life situations, it is necessary that participants make 
the choice to feign by themselves, without the 
instruction to do so. Therefore, the present study 
addresses the topic in a different manner. First of all, 
participants are put in a situation which should tempt 
them to fake symptoms by choice. Residual effects 
will then be investigated by means of a behavioural 
task in addition to self- report measures.  
For a therapist to figure out whether symptom 
reports can be taken as true or should be considered 
more carefully, it is helpful to know whether some 
groups of patients are more prone to feigning 
symptoms than others. That way, patient profiles 
can give a hint to what extend a patient`s statements 
about his/her condition need verification. A 
character trait that could possibly be associated with 
feigning is called phantasy proneness. Wilson and 
Barber were the first to come up with the trait. 
Interviewing subjects who were excellently 
responding to hypnosis, they found that these 
individuals had a profound fantasy life and vivid 
sensory experiences, their fantasies were often as 
“real as life” and they had lively memories of their 
early and recent life experiences (Wilson & Barber, 
1982). Fantasy proneness has also been related to 
false positive response confabulation (Merckelbach, 
Muris, Horselenberg & Stougie, 2000). It will 
therefore be investigated whether fantasy proneness 
can also be related to feigning, in so far as 
participants who obtain high scores for fantasy 
proneness are more prone to feigning symptoms. 
METHODS 
To assess the level of fantasy proneness, 
participants filled out the Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Horselenberg & 
Muris, 2001), a short self- report measure of fantasy 
proneness. Their hearing abilities were measured by 
means of pure tone audiometry. To trigger their 
desire to feign symptoms, participants were then 
told that the following hearing task could 
negatively affect their hearing abilities for up to one 
week. They were told that taking part could lead to 
tinnitus- like symptoms. A short clip was played 
illustrating a tinnitus. Subsequently, the 
experimenter mentioned that the test can and should 
be skipped by participants who already experience 
symptoms of hearing impairment, and that, if this is 
the case, participants should indicate this clearly on 
a hearing impairment symptom list (The SSQ12_1). 
The purpose of this manipulation was to provoke 
the desire to avoid the hearing test and thereby 
trigger the feigning of symptoms on the following 
self-report questionnaire. Participants had to 
indicate whether they wanted to skip the task 
(check the “skip task” or “do not skip task” box) 
after which they were asked to answer several 
questions related to hearing abilities. This resulted 
in two groups: a feigning (those who wanted to skip 
the task) and a non- feigning (those who did not 
want to skip the task) group. The announced 
unpleasant hearing task was not conducted. The 
experimenter told participants in the non-feigning 
group that there was a problem with the program 
and that the task had to be skipped. Participants 
were handed a scale on current emotions 
(dissonance scale), including questions about guilt 
and nervousness, to measure cognitive dissonance. 
Participants then performed the auditory detection 
task as a behavioural measure to assess residual 
effects of feigning. The task was to detect target 
sounds out of masker sounds (informational 
masking). After this, they were handed the second 
version of the SSQ12 (SSQ12_2), as a self- report 
measure. Participants were interviewed eventually, 
to investigate whether they were aware of the 
manipulation. 
RESULTS 
None of the participants showed impaired hearing 
on the pure tone audiometry. 30% of participants 
indicated that they want to skip the manipulation 
task. None of the participants noticed that he/she 
was manipulated and that the pretended unpleasant 
hearing task was non-existent. A repeated measures 
ANOVA did not show a significant interaction 
effect between group (feigning/ non- feigning) and 
time of measurement (first measurement with the 
option to feign symptoms, second measurement at 
the end of the experiment) of the SSQ12 (p = 0.45). 
There was a significant main effect for SSQ12, with 
lower scores, and thus poorer rated hearing abilities 
on the SSQ12_2 compared to the SSQ12_1 (p = 
0.01). A trend can be seen for the scores of the 
feigning group declining more than those of the 
non- feigning group (see figure1).  
Figure 1 
 
The scores for both groups on the SSQ12_1 as well 
as for the SSQ12_2 differed non-significantly. A 
comparison of the two groups considering reaction 
time for the informational masking paradigm 
yielded no significant result. Looking at the means, 
participants who skipped the manipulation task 
obtained longer reaction times than those who did 
not skip. The t- test for both groups on d- prime was 
significant with a large effect size, with participants 
who skipped the manipulation task obtaining lower 
scores (performing worse) than those who did not 
skip (p = 0.04, Cohen`s d = 1.07). Comparing group 
scores on the CEQ lead to no significant results on 
the t- test and a small effect size (p = 0.74, Cohen`s 
d = 0.17). Scores on the CEQ did not differ a lot 
between participants. Likewise, the two groups did 
not show significantly different result when tested 
for cognitive dissonance by means of a t- test (p = 
0.89). The obtained effect size was small as well 
(Cohen`s d = 0.07). All participants, regardless of 
group, indicated none or only slight experiences of 
guilt. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate 
residual effects of feigning by means of different 
measures. Therefore, self- report as well as 
behavioural measures were deployed. Additionally, 
the relationship between the trait fantasy proneness 
and a tendency to feign symptoms was explored. A 
first assumption was that participants who decide to 
skip the manipulation task would score lower on the 
SSQ12_1. It was stated as a prerequisite for being 
allowed to skip the task that one has already 
experienced at least slight hearing difficulties. 
Participants were told to decide whether or not they 
want to do the task and to fill in the hearing 
questionnaire accordingly. An effect of the choice 
to skip or not to skip on the score on the SSQ12_1 
has not been found. People who skipped the 
manipulation task indicated a similar level of 
hearing ability on the SSQ12_1 as people who 
decided to do the task. The intention behind the 
manipulation was to make people feign by 
indicating lower hearing abilities on the hearing 
scale. It can thus be said that the manipulation did 
not lead to the intended effect. People did not 
voluntarily feign symptoms. Moreover, skipping 
the manipulation task did not lead to the experience 
of guilt. Almost all of the participants indicated to 
have no feelings of guilt at all. Perceived guilt was 
used as a measure of cognitive dissonance, which 
has been assumed to be the mechanism underlying 
residual effects of feigning (see Merckelbach & 
Merten, 2012). This assumption can thus not be 
confirmed by this experiment. Nevertheless, it can 
be argued that by indicating their intention to skip 
the task, participants accepted the general 
prerequisite that only people who have hearing 
difficulties are allowed to skip. By making this 
choice they thus accepted general hearing 
difficulties, even if they did not directly indicate 
those symptoms themselves. Nevertheless, the 
following findings have to be evaluated with 
caution.  
To investigate residual effects of feigning via self- 
report measures, participants filled out the hearing 
scale twice. Interestingly, both groups, feigners and 
non- feigners, indicated lower hearing abilities on 
the second compared to the first hearing scale. This 
effect was even more profound for feigners (see 
figure 1). The first hearing scale was administered 
prior to and the second one immediately after the 
auditory detection task. The auditory detection task 
was designed to be demanding and hard. It was 
difficult for most participants to understand the task 
in the beginning and nobody performed perfectly. 
This difficult task probably let people lose 
confidence in their hearing abilities. Further, it 
might have confirmed feigners in actually having 
problems with their audition, which in turn led 
them to indicate even more symptoms on the 
following hearing scale.  
Concerning the behavioural measure, an effect of 
feigning was found. Those participants who feigned 
symptoms (those who decided to skip the 
manipulation task) performed worse on the auditory 
detection task and needed more time for detecting a 
target sequence. This can be seen as proof for 
residual effects of feigning on a behavioural 
measure. As this, the finding provides an additional 
proof for what previous studies already suggest: 
Feigning symptoms leads to residual effects that 
influence self- evaluation and as well behaviour. 
The finding of residual effects on a behavioural 
measure rules out participants` tendency to answer 
consistently as a possible explanation for the effect. 
Moreover, residual effects of feigning have been 
suggested for physical in addition to psychological 
symptoms. They should be considered in medical 
settings like in psychological ones. At the same 
time, the obtained results could also be ascribed to 
actual poorer hearing abilities of some individuals 
that have not been detected by the audiometry. 
However, there was no difference in ratings for 
feigners and non- feigners on the first hearing scale, 
which makes this explanation unlikely. Another 
possible explanation for the findings could be that 
some of the participants just were not motivated to 
take part in the experiment. As a result, they wanted 
to skip the manipulation task to save time and did 
not put a lot of effort into performing well on the 
auditory detection task. This might also explain 
why no difference between the two groups on the 
first hearing scale was found. But, opposed to this, 
most feigners indicated in the exit interview that 
they decided to skip the manipulation task because 
they did not want to experience the supposed 
hearing symptoms. 
CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis that fantasy prone individuals have 
the tendency to feign symptoms more often has to 
be rejected. There was no difference in scores of 
fantasy proneness for feigners and non- feigners. It 
has to be mentioned that the sample was quite 
homogenous in relation to fantasy proneness. A 
more diverse sample might show different results.  
All in all, even though it has not been proven that 
the manipulation worked as intended, a clear trend 
can be seen for people feigning hearing symptoms 
to subsequently rate their hearing abilities as worse 
and perform worse on a behavioural (hearing) task. 
In combination with previous studies, which clearly 
found residual effects of feigning on self- report 
measures, it can be assumed that this trend has not 
been found haphazardly.  
The present study shows several limitations, like a 
small sample size and an insufficient manipulation. 
Eventually, this study can be seen as a rather 
explorative investigation. Results will have to be 
proven by further examinations with more 
participants and improved methodology. 
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